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Abstract 
Supply chain outsourcing has posed problems for conventional labour regulation, which focuses on 
employers contracting directly with workers, particularly employees. These difficulties have been 
exacerbated by the traditional trifurcated approach to regulation of pay and conditions, WHS and workers’ 
compensation. This paper analyses the parallel interaction of two legal developments within the Australian 
textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) industry. The first is mandatory contractual tracking mechanisms within 
state and federal labour laws and the second is the duties imposed by the harmonised Work Health and 
Safety Acts. Their combined effect has created an innovative, fully enforceable and integrated regulatory 
framework for the TCF industry and, it is argued, other supply chains in different industry contexts. This 
paper highlights how regulatory solutions can address adverse issues for workers at the bottom of contractual 
networks such as fissured workplaces and capital fragmentation by enabling regulators to harness the 
commercial power of business controllers at the apex to ensure compliance throughout the entire chain. 
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Introduction 
 
There is now a growing body of evidence that workers within, and especially at the bottom of, supply chains 
experience a range of adverse working conditions, including inferior pay and work health and safety, linked 
to the commercial dynamics of outsourcing arrangements (Walters and James 2011: 989; James et al. 2007: 
166-170; Rawling and Kaine 2012: 238; Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 2004: 145-147; Quinlan and Wright 
2008; Mayhew and Quinlan 2006). This paper examines the position of home-based workers in the textile, 
clothing and footwear (TCF) industry, where major retailers routinely exercise commercial influence 
throughout their supply chains to control the parameters under which work is performed, even by workers 
who have no direct dealings with them.  
 
Supply chain outsourcing of this type has posed problems for conventional labour regulation, which focuses 
on employers contracting directly with workers, particularly employees (Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 
2004: 137; Rawling and Kaine 2012: 238; Johnstone et al. 2012). These difficulties have been exacerbated 
by the regulatory tradition of three separate legal frameworks for (i) WHS, (ii) pay, working hours and 
conditions, and (iii) workers’ compensation.  
 
This paper develops existing scholarship on Australian supply chain regulation by analysing the parallel 
interaction of two legal developments that address working conditions in Australian TCF supply chains. The 
first is the legislative establishment of mandatory contractual tracking mechanisms within state and federal 
labor law systems. These mechanisms follow the allocation of TCF work, tie in liability and legal 
responsibility for fair working conditions throughout entire supply chains and integrate minimum standards 
for pay, hours and working conditions, WHS and access to workers’ compensation for supply chain workers. 
 
The second development is in the newly harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts, which no longer impose 
duties on ‘employers’ to ‘employees’ and ‘others’ (see Johnstone 1999 and 2006), but rather introduce 
general duties to ensure WHS and duties to consult, co-operate and co-ordinate on each ‘person conducting a 
business or undertaking’ (PCBU) in relation to all ‘workers’ who carry out work for the PCBU.  
 
This paper argues that the combined effect of these developments is to require retailers and their clothing 
suppliers to track exactly which workers, including outworkers, are performing the work, and to ensure their 
health, safety, correct pay and other labour law entitlements. It also argues that a broad range of supply 
chains in industries beyond the TCF sector might also be regulated effectively by similar mandatory schemes 
which adapt and apply the essential features of the TCF industry specific model to other industry contexts. 
This paper highlights that, if governments are willing, appropriate regulatory solutions can be used to 
satisfactorily address the problems identified in the employment relations scholarship regarding the 
significant adverse effects for precarious workers of supply chain outsourcing, fissured workplaces and 
capital fragmentation. 
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This article draws on interviews conducted for a project on the operation and effectiveness of supply 
chain regulation in the TCF and road transport industries funded by an Australian Research Council 
Discovery Grant. 2  The project methodology includes a rigorous legal and policy analysis of the 
statutory provisions regulating working conditions in supply chains, at least 50 qualitative interviews (20 
of state regulators, 20 of trade union regulators, 10 of retailers, contractors and workers), participant 
observation of union and state regulators, qualitative analysis of documents generated by regulators, 
retailers and contractors, and quantitative analysis of measurable statistical data or records about 
working conditions within the industries (for example, the number of workers, number of workplaces, 
working conditions, regulator’s workplace visits etc).  
 
 
The context: TCF supply chains 
 
Historically, Australian TCF production involved principal clothing suppliers, such as fashion houses, 
handing out manufacturing work to multiple factories, many of them engaging substantial onsite workforces. 
Traditional responses to seasonal peaks in retail demand were met by engaging home-based clothing workers 
(also known in Australia as ‘homeworkers’ or ‘outdoor workers’ or ‘outworkers’), a reserve labour force in 
the TCF industry.  
 
Forty years ago, the Australian government’s removal of tariff barriers against overseas imports resulted in a 
change from factory-based manufacturing to an industry of interlocking pyramidal contracting arrangements 
and workforces heavily composed of outworkers. At the apex of these contractual chains, the ‘effective 
business controllers’ of these supply chains - a small number of commercially dominant retailers - typically 
entered into arrangements for the supply of clothing products with principal manufacturers and/or fashion 
houses. These principal manufacturers and fashion houses then contracted production from multiple smaller 
manufacturers or offsite contractors. In some instances these production orders were successively handed 
down through a sequence of intervening parties until the goods were finally constructed by an outworker. 
The finished goods were then delivered back up the contractual chain to the original principal manufacturer 
or fashion house.   
 
Each step down the pyramid involved an increasing number of commercial players, each of which exerted a 
lesser degree of commercial influence over the supply chain than those on the step above them. At the base 
were clothing outworkers, with little influence over their working conditions. The commercial power of 
major retailers enabled them to secure favourable terms (price, quality control and turnaround time), 
proactive rights of inspection for quality control and exacting indemnity provisions in their contractual 
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arrangements with principal manufacturers, whether domestic or international. These arrangements gave the 
retailers considerable legal authority to intervene actively into key aspects of the operation of their supply 
chains, so that in the past major retailers have presided over contractual arrangements providing them with 
quickly produced, quality clothing and high profit margins derived at the expense of outworkers sufficiently 
distant, in a legal sense, from the retailers to minimise the retailers’ legal liability for workers’ pay and 
conditions (Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 2004: 143-146, 151). In the absence of government intervention, 
however, contractual ‘governance structures’ (Nossar 2008: 1, 8) of this kind have rarely, if ever, provided 
effective protections for outworkers. 
 
Historical Legal Regulation of TCF Supply Chains in Australia 
 
During the twentieth century, TCF outworkers’ working conditions were predominantly regulated by Federal 
and state industry-specific industrial award provisions, established by industrial tribunals, usually for 
employees. This traditional labour law framework suffered from three systematic deficiencies limiting the 
effective regulation of TCF labour, and clothing outworkers in particular. First, the regulatory framework 
displayed an ‘entitlement gap’, because it generally only covered ‘employees’ directly employed by an 
‘employer’ under a ‘contract of employment’ (Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 2004: 147). Clothing work 
providers sought to minimise their exposure by formally characterising outworkers as ‘independent 
contractors’, or even sometimes as ‘trust unit holders’, rather than as ‘employees’. Such corporate structuring 
arrangements also enabled employers to avoid or minimise insurance premiums or manipulate claims.  
 
State and territory parliaments responded to these issues by inserting deeming provisions in workers’ 
compensation and some state industrial relations and WHS statutes. These provisions assigned legal 
responsibilities and obligations of an ‘employer’ to parties that immediately and directly dealt with 
outworkers, who then became the ‘deemed employees’ of those work providers (Rawling 2006). In the TCF 
industry, however, the majority of the direct work providers to outworkers were small entities with limited 
commercial power and resources to meet their labour law obligations. These entities tended to be transient 
and outworkers were frequently unable to initiate and complete legal proceedings to enforce obligations or 
recover debts before these providers exited the industry. In addition, the use of strategies such as falsified 
business records, shelf companies and complex group company structures protected these entities from 
traditional enforcement proceedings (Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 2004: 147). 
 
The use of these strategies for evading the operation of awards and deeming provisions reveals the second 
deficiency of traditional regulatory frameworks – even workers who were formally protected found the 
mechanisms for enforcement to be inadequate. WHS regimes were traditionally designed for permanent 
employees, usually located at large workplaces (Johnstone 1999; Johnstone, Mayhew and Quinlan 2001, 
Johnstone 2006 and Maxwell 2004: ch 3 and 13). Employers were often confused about their responsibilities 
to subcontractors and other precarious workers under WHS general duty provisions, a problem exacerbated 
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by inadequate resourcing of WHS inspectorates (Australian Senate Committee Inquiry 1996; Senate 
Committee Inquiry 1998). Where there were complex subcontracting arrangements, employers and 
inspectors struggled to identify the relevant employer, or otherwise determine the employment status of 
particular parties, and inspectors had difficulty locating isolated, easily mobile home-based workers. 
Regulatory oversight was inhibited by workers’ relative ‘invisibility’. Effective enforcement of supply chains 
requires regulators to be able to locate all work sites in a chain, so that they can physically inspect premises, 
check documentary records and determine the conditions under which each individual worker labours 
(Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 2004: 148).  
 
The final systemic regulatory deficiency arose from the absence of any formal legal obligation upon the 
major retailers at the apex of the supply chains. Traditionally, retail sale activity fell outside the jurisdictional 
scope of clothing industry manufacture, and thus outside the scope of clothing trades awards, especially in 
the Commonwealth system. This deficiency provided an economic context in which parties further down the 
supply chain could only survive commercial pressures by reducing their costs, often through non-compliance 
with their labour law or WHS obligations.  
 
Regulatory Development beyond the Traditional Framework   
 
Following campaigns by trade unions and community groups highlighting these issues, the federal industrial 
tribunal inserted innovative provisions into the federal clothing award in 1987/88 enabling union and 
government regulatory agencies to track the contracting process from the level of principal manufacturers 
down, through each level, to the outworkers themselves. The award required each employer who gave out 
clothing work to proactively provide a list of the destinations (both identity and location) of their garment 
manufacture work. Each employer was to provide the required list every six months and was also required to 
keep a record of the sewing time for each clothing product. The award provisions empowered regulatory 
agencies to access records of work orders (most importantly, the number of goods ordered – known as 
‘volume’) and to cross-check the validity of the assigned sewing time (by conducting time tests in 
comparable factory contexts). Any failure to provide this information was automatically a breach of 
industrial law. These award provisions were supplemented in 1995 by a federal industrial tribunal decision 
giving regulatory agencies access to contract details of pricing (for each of the goods ordered) at each level 
of the contracting process (Australian Industrial Relations Commission: 1995) (known as ‘value’) from the 
level of principal manufacturers downwards.   
 
These new award provisions were soon incorporated into the counterpart state clothing awards in a number 
of state jurisdictions, but the provisions were confined to the realm of ‘industrial relations law’ – with no 
immediate application to either WHS regulation or workers’ compensation coverage for outworkers. The 
award provisions also failed to impose any enforceable obligations upon the most significant players in the 
clothing supply chains: the major retailers. Further trade union and community campaigning induced the 
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industry bodies representing retailers and manufacturing employers to adopt voluntary codes of practice 
aimed at securing these entitlements for outworkers. The retailer and manufacturing employer voluntary 
codes were united under the single umbrella of the Homeworkers Code of Practice (HWCP) but both 
exhibited inherent regulatory flaws. The manufacturing employer code, for example, relied upon 
documentary assertions by the manufacturers themselves (in the form of statutory declarations). The various 
versions of voluntary codes (Homeworkers Code of Practice 1996, 1997, 1998) adopted by the retailer 
representative body were even weaker.  
 
By contrast, one major retailer, Target, adopted a voluntary code that included provisions resembling those 
in the federal award obliging it to proactively provide regular lists of suppliers (along with reactive 
obligations for disclosure of all supply contracts) and to consider disciplining any supplier, by terminating 
their supply contract and by refusing to enter into any further contracts, if the supplier failed to remedy any 
breaches of outworker legal provisions that had been brought to the retailer’s attention by the regulator 
(Target Deed 1995). This kind of Deed was subsequently adopted by a handful of other effective business 
controllers, including Country Road, Ken Done and Australia Post (Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 2004: 
149-150). 
 
The Emergence and Export of Supply Chain Regulation  
 
From June 1999 a new regulatory model emerged in New South Wales (Nossar 1999), designed to integrate 
traditional regulatory mechanisms with proposals that harnessed the contractual power of the major retailers 
in TCF supply chains and created a general model available for export to other Australian jurisdictions 
(Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 2004: 137, 156 - 158; Rawling 2006). The new model proposed that major 
retailers be bound by legal obligations giving regulatory agencies full access, at regular intervals, to details 
of contracting arrangements across the entire supply chain. The proposed model also adapted the commercial 
disciplinary mechanism introduced in the Target Deed in 1995. Suppliers faced legislatively prescribed 
discipline by the effective business controllers of their supply chain, the retailer, for the persistent breach of 
any legal provision protecting outworkers, whether imposed by industrial law, WHS or workers’ 
compensation legislation (Nossar 1999: 24-27).  
 
Rather than simply adopt the existing legal mechanisms from the awards and the voluntary codes discussed 
above, the new regulatory model proposed that legislation import carefully designed standard contractual 
provisions into retailer contracting arrangements (Nossar 1999: 24-27). These standardised provisions 
enabled retailers themselves (under the active oversight of regulators) to regulate working conditions 
wherever TCF outworkers carried out work. The model provides effective cross-jurisdictional reach to 
regulate supply chains across Australian jurisdictions, potentially providing an effective solution to 
geographical jurisdictional limits which have traditionally posed problems for enforcement. These 
developments open the way for the establishment of new contractual mechanisms requiring effective 
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business controllers to regulate working conditions wherever work is performed - even at overseas locations 
outside the regulating state altogether (Nossar 2007: 9, 16, 20; Nossar 2008: paras [14-21]; Johnstone 2012: 
79-80).  
 
In addition to the ‘top down’ obligations imposed on the retailers, the new model included two 
corresponding ‘bottom up’ components. The first centred on entrenching the ‘employee’ status of all (not 
just TCF) outworkers by proposing that the statutory deeming provisions for outworkers be extended to 
jurisdictions where no such deeming provisions yet existed (Nossar 1999: 1-23). The second created a new 
statutory recovery mechanism entitling outworkers to serve a claim for unpaid industrial entitlements upon 
any entity in the supply chain up to (and including) the level of the principal supplier. Once served with such 
a claim, the onus of proof for civil law recovery would be reversed onto the principal supplier, who would 
then be obliged to pay that claim within a relatively short fixed period of time – regardless of how many 
commercial parties there were between the principal supplier and the outworker – unless the principal 
supplier could prove that the outworker serving the claim had not done the work or that the claim calculation 
was erroneous (Nossar 1999: 1-23). Together, these key features of the new regulatory model came to be 
labelled ‘supply chain regulation’ (SCR) (Rawling 2006).  
 
To date, five state jurisdictions have implemented aspects of the supply chain regulatory model:  New South 
Wales in 2001, Victoria in 2003, both Queensland and South Australia in 2005 followed by the 
Commonwealth in March 2012 (Rawling 2006; Johnstone et al. 2012: 68-69, 103-106, 160-161). Although 
the NSW provisions were confined to the TCF industry the ‘deemed employer’ status was extended to 
virtually all parties further up the supply chain by inserting the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ into the existing 
NSW industrial deeming provision for clothing outworkers (see in particular, Schedule 1(f) Industrial 
Relations Act 1996 (NSW)). This created a framework for a statutory right of recovery by outworkers that 
could be developed around the concept of the ‘apparent employer’ - a legal concept extended to any party in 
the contracting chain, aside from the retailer (Rawling 2006: 530). As part of these reforms the NSW state 
parliament also amended the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) to oblige all suppliers within supply 
chains to fully and accurately disclose details of their subcontracting or else bear the liability for any unpaid 
workers' compensation insurance premiums within that chain (Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 2004: 156-
158). 
 
Subsequent enactments of the SCR statutory package around various jurisdictions became progressively less 
industry-specific. In 2005 South Australia enacted legislation that provided a legal foundation for model 
provisions that do not rely on the concept of direct employment, delivering labour law protections via 
commercial contractual arrangements (Rawling 2006: 532-33). Under these South Australian statutory 
provisions a contractual pyramid in any industry may be regulated despite the absence of any common law 
contract of employment within that pyramid, establishing the basis for a generic legislative model regulating 
contract networks more generally (Rawling 2006: 538-41).  
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Three of the four states that enacted the statutory package - NSW in 2004, South Australia in 2006, and 
Queensland in 2010 - also created broadly similar mandatory apparel retail codes that impose upon TCF 
retailers and suppliers record-keeping and reactive and proactive obligations to disclose full supply chain 
contract details to regulators. These mandatory codes import standardised, enforceable provisions into 
retailer supply contracts requiring suppliers further down the chain to inform retailers about all locations 
where domestic apparel production is conducted, on pain of loss of their contracts with the retailer 
(Johnstone 2012: 79). The Queensland mandatory code was repealed in 2012.  
 
The state legislative developments described above stimulated negotiation of a new voluntary retailer code of 
practice in NSW (NSW Ethical Clothing Code of Practice, 2002) and a later mirror national voluntary 
retailer code (National TCFUA/Retailer Ethical Clothing Code of Practice, 2002). Both of these codes 
incorporate all of the key features of the 1995 Target Deed and have been adopted by all major retailers in 
Australia. As the issue gained public attention, high profile transnational effective business controllers such 
as Reebok also entered into new improved voluntary Deed arrangements which now authorise regulators to 
access and inspect sites of production outside Australia (Reebok Deed 2003; R M Williams Deed 2003; 
Nossar 2007: 5-12, 19-36; Nossar 2008: paras 14-21; Johnstone 2012: 79-80).  
 
The two remaining state mandatory codes explicitly refrain from applying their mandatory provisions to any 
retailer or manufacturing supplier that is signatory to – and compliant  with – the voluntary codes and current 
provisions of the HWCP (NSW Mandatory Code, 2005: cl 8(1)(e); South Australian Mandatory Code, 
2006:cl 8(1)(e)). These provisions exempting the application of the two mandatory codes for retailers have 
completely transformed the practical enforceability of the HWCP provisions. Failure, by either retailers or 
suppliers, to comply with the ‘voluntary’ HWCP provisions now incurs the full application of the entire 
mandatory code regime, which is tougher in the scope – and severity – of the obligations imposed and is also 
enforceable in court with substantial financial penalties upon conviction (NSW Mandatory Code 2005: cl20 
(8); South Australian Mandatory Code 2006: cl 20(8)). Thus, by one instrument or the other, all national 
Australian retailers are now compelled to provide details of their TCF supply contracts to regulators.  
 
Recent Federal Developments 
 
Each of these state SCR legislative provisions has survived a succession of Commonwealth statutory 
encroachments up to, and including, the enactment of the federal Fair Work Act 2009 (Rawling 2007; 
Rawling 2009) and the latest referral of most state industrial relations powers to the Commonwealth 
(Creighton and Stewart 2010: 118-21). The federal TCF award, made under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) 
(FWA) has the same key features as the original clothing award provisions created in the late 1980s.    
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In March 2012, amendments to the FWA (Part 6 - 4A) enacted a new regulatory model by largely adopting 
the earlier NSW state SCR legislative formula, with the same TCF industry-specific limitations, the 
extension of the deeming provisions and statutory right of recovery to work given out ‘directly or indirectly’ 
(part 604A, Div 2), and by adapting the definition of ‘principal’ (section 17A) from the current federal TCF 
award. The federal provisions also adapted certain features from the South Australian state SCR legislative 
approach, including the reference to ‘a chain or series of 2 or more arrangements’ in the definition of 
‘principal’ (FWA: s17A; see also Rawling 2006: 533) and in the definition of a retailer as being a retailer 
that does not have ‘any right to supervise or otherwise control the performance of the work before the goods 
are delivered to’ that retailer (FWA: Part 6 - 4A, Divs 3, s789 CA(5)(b); see also South Australian 
Mandatory Code 2006: cls 5 and 28). The FWA provisions also create a statutory right of recovery that 
includes a reversal of the onus of proof (onto the party served with the claim for recovery) and scope for 
recovery against almost any party in the supply chain apart from retailers without rights to supervise or 
otherwise control production prior to delivery of goods (FWA: Part 6-4a, Div 3; Potter 2012: 42-43).  
 
Although these amendments to the FWA confer the capacity to create mandatory legal obligations that can 
bind all parties in TCF supply chains, up to and including the ultimate retailers, (Part 6-4A, Div 4), there are 
currently no practically enforceable SCR legal obligations imposed on major retailers by Commonwealth 
legislative instruments. The only effective provisions regulating retailers on a national level throughout 
Australia are the NSW and South Australian mandatory codes, operating with their cross-jurisdictional reach, 
together with the new and improved national ‘voluntary’ retailers’ code. 
 
Once this type of information could be accessed and cross-checked from the level of the retailers down 
throughout the entire contract chain, the combination of these ‘value and volume’ measures has become a 
key tool in the practical operation of TCF regulation. Regulators can track the real flow of TCF work orders 
to all locations and access all relevant information, especially price paid and volumes ordered (the numerical 
output of garments and assigned working times for each particular product) for each of the contracts between 
all the commercial parties in the contracting chain. Regulators can then aggregate this information (along 
with the piece rate paid) to estimate the total labour time required for production at any level in the supply 
chain. At this point the regulator may be able to estimate the equivalent number of full time employees 
required to complete a particular production order. Regulators can then utilise their legislative and 
contractually-based powers to inspect all production sites without notice to check the accuracy of workplace 
records and locate the entire workforce.  
 
The significance of this was explained by the union regulator as follows: 
 
So probably the most significant thing I think is the method in being able to determine how many 
employees are within any one operation. And that’s brought about by an award requirement where 
each company … is to provide us with a list of each of the contractors they give work to, [and] an 
array of other information on name, address, and contact details. But in particular they have to provide 
us with the sewing time that’s required to be provided for each garment that’s produced. So as a 
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garment is issued to a contractor there has to be a sewing time provided. …a payment that’s made for 
each minute’s worth of work. And in the case of our industry, it’s currently on 53 cents a minute. That 
rate, with the minutes, lets us determine the number of hours that are required, the number of days that 
are required in terms of work, and the number of full time employees that are required to produce the 
work. That in itself creates massive transparency within the industry. So for me, that’s the critical tool 
that’s different I think from a lot of other supply chains maybe in other industries (Interview with 
union regulator, 2013). 
 
Extending the reach of work health and safety regulation 
 
Beginning in 2008, and culminating in the adoption by 2011 of a Model Work Health and Safety Act (Model 
Act) in the form of Work Health and Safety Acts (WHS Acts) in each Australian jurisdiction apart from 
Victoria and Western Australia, Australian WHS legislation has been largely harmonised. Four features of 
the WHS Acts substantially complement the labour law provisions discussed previously by requiring TCF 
retailers, fashion houses, makers and contractors to identify the location of outworkers and to consult, co-
operate and co-ordinate their WHS activities.  
 
The first significant provision is the ‘primary duty’ of care (s 19) owed, not by employers to employees, as 
was the dominant pre-harmonisation approach, but by ‘a person conducting a business or undertaking’ 
(PCBU) to ‘workers’. The National Review into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws in its First 
Report (2008: 46) argued that the pre-harmonisation approach was ‘too limited, as it maintain[ed] the link to 
the employment relationship as a determinant of the duty of care’ and ‘the changing nature of work 
arrangements and relationships make this link no longer sufficient to protect all persons engaged in work 
activities.’  Consequently, the primary duty (s 19(1)) provides that the PCBU must, as far as is reasonably 
practicable, ensure the WHS of all workers engaged or caused to be engaged, or whose activities are 
influenced or directed, by the PCBU ‘while the workers are at work in the business or undertaking’. The 
Explanatory Memorandum (at [23]) to the Model Act makes it clear that the phrase ‘business or undertaking’ 
is ‘intended to be read broadly and covers businesses and undertakings conducted by persons including 
employers, principal contractors, head contractors, franchisors and the Crown’. The case law on ‘business or 
undertaking’ in the pre-harmonisation WHS statutes does indeed take a broad approach (see Whittaker v 
Delmina Pty Ltd (1998) 87 IR 268), and has held that the extent of the undertaking is a question of fact 
(Victorian WorkCover Authority v Horsham Rural City Council [2008] VSC 404: [36]). More than one 
person may be conducting an undertaking in any one situation.  
 
The WHS Acts (s 7) define ‘workers’ very broadly to include any person who carries out ‘work in any 
capacity for’ a PCBU, and specifically includes ‘outworkers’. It is clear that the primary duty applies to the 
TCF supply chains described earlier in this paper, at least from the fashion house downward, so that 
outworkers at the bottom of TCF supply chains will be owed the primary duty by the fashion house which 
designs the clothing and draws up the specification sheets, and all head contractors, contractors 
subcontractors further down the chain. For example, the fashion house will owe the primary duty to its direct 
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employees, employees of the maker or contractor, or any subcontractors or outworkers engaged by any of 
those parties, because the fashion house has caused each of those workers to be engaged, and/or directs 
and/or influences the work of each worker, and the outworkers are ‘at work’ in the fashion house’s business 
of designing and making clothes.  
 
Whether all retailers owe the primary duty to outworkers is a little more complex. Where the PCBU fashion 
house is also the retailer, then the PCBU would owe the duty as both fashion house and retailer. If the retailer 
is not also the fashion house, but, for example, a department store, and plays some part in the design and/or 
specifications of the clothes, then the outworker is most likely part of the department store’s business, and 
the department store will be engaging, influencing and directing the outworker. If, however, the department 
store simply provides retail space for the fashion house/retailer to sell its clothes, it might be argued that the 
outworkers are not ‘at work in’ the department store’s business, and may not be engaged, influenced or 
directed by the department store. In this instance, however, the department store will owe the PCBU’s 
section 19(2) duty to ‘ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the health and safety of other persons is 
not put at risk from the work carried out as part of the conduct of the business or undertaking.’ This duty 
might be breached by, for example, the department store putting pressure on the supply chain to reduce the 
price of the clothes, although it might be argued that this is not ‘a risk from work carried out as part of the 
business’. 
 
The primary duties of retailers, fashion houses, makers, contractors and subcontractors are overlapping and 
non-delegable: each party owes the duty to workers below it, even though others owe a similar duty (see s 
14-16 of the WHS Acts). Clearly this requires each party owing the primary duty to know of the existence 
and location of each worker in the chain in order to exercise the requisite care. As one clothing company 
manager observed, once the SCR statutory package and the primary duty came into force: 
We basically picked up 350 extra people who we were responsible for … because we tell 
them that whilst we have always had a duty of care and I guess, wanted to support whatever 
issues they are experiencing, we now have a legal responsibility to do that. I think the OHS 
legislative changes have really opened up dialogue beyond what was normally happening 
(Interview with Australian clothing company, 2013). 
 
The duty owed to outworkers will include psychosocial issues (s 4, definition of ‘health’), including stress 
induced by the way outworkers’ work is organised, including excessive working hours.  
 
The second significant provision is the ‘officers’ duty (WHS Acts, s 27). Unlike the officers duty in the pre-
harmonisation statutes, which relied on attributed liability (ie imputed or accessorial liability), the officer’s 
duty is a positive and proactive duty to ‘exercise due diligence to ensure that’ the PCBU ‘complies with’ a 
duty or obligation that the PCBU owes under the Act (s 27(1)). It is a positive duty in the sense that an 
officer who does not exercise the required due diligence can be in breach of the duty even if the PCBU is not 
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breaching its duties (s 27(4)). Thus each company secretary, director and senior manager of each PCBU in a 
TCF supply chain must (s 27(5)) ‘take reasonable steps’ to 
a) acquire and keep up-to-date knowledge of WHS matters;  
b) gain an understanding of the nature of the PCBU’s operations and generally of the hazards and 
risks associated with those operations; and 
c) ensure that the PCBU has available for use, and uses, appropriate resources and processes to 
eliminate or minimise risks to WHS from work carried out as part of the conduct of the business 
or undertaking; and 
d) ensure that the PCBU has appropriate processes for receiving and considering information 
regarding incidents, hazards and risks and responding in a timely way to that information;  
e) ensure that the PCBU has, and implements, processes for complying with any duty or obligation  
under the Act; and 
f) verify the provision and use of the resources and processes referred to above. 
 
These are far-reaching duties, and require each officer to have extensive knowledge of the supply chain and 
the WHS risks faced by all workers in the supply chain. Managers who are not ‘officers’ owe the worker’s 
duty (s 28) to take ‘reasonable care’ that their acts or omissions do not adversely affect the health and safety 
of other persons, which would include outworkers. 
 
The third significant provision is section 46 of the WHS Acts, which provides that ‘if more than one person 
has the same duty concurrently under this Act, each person with the duty must, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, consult, co-operate and co-ordinate activities with all other persons who have a duty in relation 
to the same matter.’ This provision seeks to prevent WHS issues arising from fractured work arrangements 
or from a lack of co-ordination between duty holders. The Code of Practice: Work Health and Safety 
Consultation, Cooperation and Coordination ensures that the PCBUs in TCF supply chains cannot assume 
that other PCBUs will take care of a health and safety matter, and requires each PCBU to find out who else is 
carrying out work, and to work together with other PCBUs in a co-operative and coordinated way to 
eliminate or minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable. 
 
The combined effect of these provisions (s 7, 19, 27 and 46) is that not only does each PCBU influencing the 
work carried out in the supply chain owe a duty to each worker below it in the chain, but that the PCBUs 
must work together to ensure that their duties are discharged in a coordinated manner. Officers have a 
proactive duty to exercise due diligence to ensure compliance by their PCBU, and this will include fulfilling 
the duty to consult, co-operate and co-ordinate with other officers owing the same duty (s 46). The impact of 
these provisions on clothing companies was described as follows: 
…. with the new changes that came in a couple of years ago with effectively making all of those 
makers part of our responsibility … we had a legal obligation to do the right thing. … we had 
meetings, we brought them in, we had sessions to educate them on the new legislation and what 
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it means. We do warehouse audits, site visits, inspections, we give them feedback. We’ve 
helped them engage contractors … If we didn’t do that we’d be exposed.  
 
.… because of our relationship with [Retailer] and their … ensuring that everyone in their 
supply chain is compliant, that really forced [us] to have a long hard look at our strategy. It’s 
made us rethink everything. … Under the current regime, the retailers will effectively audit us 
and have the right to audit us and that auditing relates primarily to: Do we have an OHS 
management system? ... they don’t necessarily need anything figures wise from our makers but 
they need to see that we are auditing the makers. They need to see that we are cascading that 
back down … [a]nd it cuts the other way too, I mean we, again under the OHS legislation, we 
would also have the opportunity to audit should we require or request the OHS management 
system from [Retailer] because we have got our employees working in their stores (Interview 
with Australian clothing company, 2013). 
 
 
Even though Victoria has not enacted the Model Act, the general duties owed by an employer to employees 
and to ‘others’ in the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) (OHSA) (s 21 and s 23 respectively), 
and the duty owed by a self-employed persons to persons other than employees (s 24), together have a 
similar effect to the primary duty in the WHS Acts, in that they impose a hierarchy of overlapping and 
complementary responsibilities on all the contracting parties in the supply chain to all workers below them in 
the chain. Further the Outworker (Improved Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) provides that ‘employee’ in a 
number of statutes (including the OHSA) includes an outworker. There is, however, in the OHSA no 
equivalent to section 46 of the WHS Acts.  
 
The fourth key set of provisions are to be found in the worker consultation, representation and participation 
provisions in the WHS Acts (Part 5, Divs 2 and 3), which are all couched in terms of ‘workers’ and the 
PCBU rather than ‘employer’ and ‘employee’. Thus, a PCBU must, so far as is reasonably practicable, 
consult with workers (or their health and safety representative (HSR)) who carry out work for the business or 
undertaking who are, or are likely to be, directly affected by a matter relating to WHS (se 47(1)). The matters 
over which consultation must take place include all measures to identify, assess and control risks, all 
proposed changes to the business or undertaking that might affect WHS, and decisions about consultation, 
monitoring worker health, resolving WHS issues and so on (s 48(1)). It would be difficult to contest the 
proposition that TCF employees, subcontractors and outworkers are ‘directly affected’ by the operations of 
the PCBU fashion houses, makers and contractors above them in a typical TCF supply chain, and that, 
consequently, each PCBU must consult all the workers below them in the supply chain to the extent that 
consultation can be suitably accomplished in the circumstances. Again, this is a significant and profound 
duty, particularly in the context of the section 46 duty, and all PCBUs in the supply chain must therefore 
consult each other and co-ordinate their activities in consulting with workers, including all outworkers, 
below them in the supply chain.  
 
Further, any worker, including an outworker, who carries out work for a business or undertaking, can request 
a PCBU to facilitate the election of a HSR (Part 5, Div 3, Subdiv 1).  Workers and the PCBU are to negotiate 
to determine one or more ‘work groups’ at one or more workplaces (Part 5, Division 3, sub-divs 1 and 2, ss 
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50-59). Work groups may be determined for workers carrying out work for two or more PCBUs (Div 3, sub-
div 3). All workers in a work group can elect the HSR. Elected HSRs have broad functions and powers (Part 
5, Division 3, sub-divisions 5 and 6) including representation, inspection, consultation, and information 
rights and the right to assistance. All ‘workers’  have the right to refuse to carry out work if the worker has a 
reasonable concern that the work would expose the worker to a serious risk to the worker's health or safety, 
emanating from an immediate or imminent exposure to a hazard (s 84).  
 
Further, elected HSRs have extensive powers to monitor PCBU compliance with sections 19, 27, 46 and 47, 
in particular, and could issue provisional improvement notices in the event that they were of the reasonable 
belief that a PCBU is not complying with those provisions. HSRs can also participate with PCBUs in 
processes to resolve WHS ‘issues’, and can make a direction to stop work that poses an immediate and 
serious risk to any worker (s 85). The WHS Acts also contain provisions enabling authorised union officials 
to enter workplaces to investigate suspected contraventions of the WHS Acts and to consult with workers 
over WHS issues (Part 7). 
 
The net effect of these provisions is to require all PCBUs and their officers to consult with all other PCBUs 
and all workers in the supply chain over WHS issues, and to ensure the WHS of all workers in the chain. 
Officers and PCBUs cannot plead ignorance of the existence of workers in the supply chain because they 
owe duties to them, and they cannot provide evidence of compliance with their section 27 and 19, 46 and 47 
duties if they are ignorant of the identity of other PCBUs or any workers. These provisions mirror those in 
the regulation of pay and conditions discussed earlier and can effectively be used by regulators to uncover 
the hidden workforces in TCF supply chains.  
 
Application of the SCR model to other supply chains 
 
There is now significant scholarship examining supply chain types and business networks (Marchington et 
al. 2005; Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005; Weil 2009). This scholarship provides valuable insights 
into variances in the exercise of power in different types of supply chains and the different types of inter-
organisational relations in business networks. It does not, however, follow that, because there is variance in 
supply chains, only some are amenable to an effective form of mandatory, top-down regulation, such as the 
legislative scheme described in this article.  
 
This paper is not advocating that the entire TCF legislative scheme be applied to other industries in its 
current form. Rather, it argues that key elements can be adapted to different industry contexts and applied on 
a case-by-case basis (James et al. 2007: 187; Rawling and Howe 2013: 246), for example, the current 
industry-specific legislative scheme in the road transport industry (Rawling and Kaine 2012).  
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To suggest that supply chain regulation should be confined to particular product markets or industries 
ignores the fact that supply chain arrangements are not static or monolithic (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 
2005: 96). Individual supply chains change over time and supply chains vary considerably from firm to firm 
as well as among different industries (Rawling and Howe 2013: 241). Further, most supply chains have 
certain basic elements which make them amenable to regulation. While certain effective business controllers 
may have a lower capacity to exercise commercial power (Nossar 2006; Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 
2005), most firms at or near the apex of supply chains exhibit, or have the capacity for, a requisite degree of 
commercial influence. This influence need not be demonstrated by explicit coordination of other supply 
chain actors; rather firms can exercise market power via their strategic position at the apex of the chain 
(Rawling and Howe 2013: 241; Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005: 98).   
 
Effective business controllers at the apex of supply chains will frequently argue against the imposition of 
mandatory supply chain regulation on the basis that they only have knowledge of their direct suppliers and 
no knowledge of, or control over, working conditions further down the chain (Wright and Brown 2013: 26; 
Nimbalker, Cremen and Wrinkle 2013: 18). However, in particular cases, unions have disproved these 
claims by providing evidence of significant knowledge and control (Nossar, Johnstone and Quinlan 2004: 
151). For example after publicity, business controllers are able to relatively quickly ascertain the conditions 
under which their supply chain workers labour (Wright and Brown 2013: 27) and the regulatory scheme 
itself further empowers firms at the apex to gather information about dealings further down the supply chain, 
and to exercise control over working conditions, as our study of TCF regulation demonstrates. 
 
Thus it is consistent with the literature to suggest that the supply chains amenable to regulation might include 
those operating in a variety of private industry sectors other than the TCF sector; those in sectors where the 
supplier delivers not only goods but services; and those in domains where government agencies rather than 
private firms are the effective business controllers (Rawling and Howe 2013: 242). Indeed, as we have 
shown, the WHS Acts already regulate supply chains throughout the Australian economy. An effective 
business controller at the apex of any Australian supply chain owes a duty to any worker (i) who carries out 
work for the business controller, and (ii) who is engaged (including through sub-contracting arrangements), 
caused to be engaged, influenced or directed by the PCBU.  
 
Our argument for further regulation is restricted to the regulation of other supply chains, rather than all 
business networks or ‘production networks’ (Rainnie et al. 2011). From a legal perspective, we distinguish 
between supply chains, made up of a vertical series of contracts or dealings between parties in the chain, and 
other types of business network such as the franchise (Weil 2009: 419), the corporate group or the triangular 
labour hire arrangement which are likely to give rise to different regulatory issues and solutions (Johnstone 
et al. 2012: 47-76).   
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Finally, there is no obvious impediment (other than a lack of political will) preventing the regulation of 
transnational supply chains extending into the jurisdiction of a domestic government. In principle an 
effective business controller selling goods within a developed world economy could be required to insert 
contractual provisions into contracts with overseas suppliers and disclose information about the overseas 
location of production of goods and the conditions under which those goods are produced (Nossar 2007, 
2008; Johnstone 2012: 80). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Innovative responses to the problems posed by supply chain outsourcing have been a feature of labour 
regulation across the TCF industry in Australia since the late 1980s. This paper has shown some of the 
historical ways in which labour laws regulating employer-employee relationships have been circumvented in 
the past. These problems have been exacerbated by the traditional trifurcated approach to regulating TCF 
working life through industrial statutes and awards, WHS legislation and workers' compensation legislation. 
 
This paper has described how developments in labour law regulation, particularly in awards, industrial 
statutes, mandatory and voluntary codes, and the newly harmonised WHS statutes, have created an 
innovative, fully enforceable and integrated regulatory framework for the TCF industry. The provisions 
discussed in this paper enable hidden workforces to be made visible and enable monitoring and enforcement 
of legal liability and responsibility for fair working conditions, correct pay and WHS in the industry. 
Importantly, these statutory schemes enable regulators to work in partnership with effective business 
controllers by harnessing their commercial power to ensure compliance. 
 
The article argues that WHS provisions and the features of the supply chain regulatory model in industrial 
statutes, mandatory codes and voluntary codes outlined in this paper can apply to all kinds of supply chain 
arrangements. The challenge is for government regulators, trade unions and other civil society institutions 
concerned with the labour conditions of workers engaged at the bottom of contractual networks to push for 
the extension of the supply chain regulatory model into other industries. The developments examined in this 
article are an example of a mandatory regulation scheme which addresses problems identified for precarious 
workers well documented in academic and policy literature. The debate regarding the effectiveness of such 
mandatory legislative schemes is an essential contribution to the knowledge base on supply chains, human 
resource management practices and labour standards both in Australia and internationally. 
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